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ABSTRACT
Facial information concerning person identity and emotional expression is vital to human
social interaction, and therefore, we find it beneficial to remember the faces we see. Little is
known, however, about whether emotional expressions facilitate or inhibit recognition for person
identity. The present studies examined the role of emotional expression on person identity
recognition by manipulating whether such information was presented at encoding (i.e., initial
perception of the actor) or at recognition (i.e., later memory for the actor). In Experiment 1,
participants recognized more actors displaying an angry rather than a happy expression, when
they initially saw actors display a neutral expression. Thus, angry rather than happy expressions
facilitated recognition memory for person identity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this
finding. Participants recognized more actors displaying a surprised rather than a disgusted, a
fearful, a happy or a sad expression, when they initially saw actors display a neutral expression.
Furthermore, participants recognized actors displaying a neutral expression, when they initially
saw actors display a surprised or a happy expression rather than a disgusted expression. Thus,
surprised and angry expressions facilitated recognition memory for person identity, whereas
surprised and happy expressions facilitated encoding of person identity. These results have
implications not only for basic research concerning cognitive models of face perception (e.g.,
Bruce & Young, 1986) and evolutionary theories of emotion but also for refinement of
methodologies used in the criminal justice system for eyewitness testimony.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to successfully move about in the social world and respond to its many
challenges, we have to rapidly make sense of our multifarious and fast-changing environment.
Part of this demanding environment includes the multitude of faces we encounter each day. The
human face—seen as we interact with others or as we encounter images of others in newspapers,
in magazines, on computer screens, at the movies, or on television—is a highly significant social
stimulus. In fact, from a simple glance at another’s face or at the image of a face, we can glean,
for example, information about one’s sex, age, and even emotional state. As part of this
information, person identity and emotional expression are possibly the most salient and essential
aspects of nonverbal communication important for our success in communicating with and
understanding others.
A facial expression, in the most parsimonious of explanations, is the result of one or more
motions or positions of the muscles of the face. We all know, however, that facial expressions
are much more informative than just that. Facial expressions convey emotion and serve as one
of the most basic techniques human beings use to exchange social information. For example, by
a simple inward and downward motion of the brow, a slight flaring of the nostrils, and a clinch of
the jaw, a person will very clearly demonstrate to others that he or she is quite angry (Ekman &
Friesen, 1975).
Consequently, because person identity and emotional expressions are so vital to human
social interaction, we find it beneficial to remember the faces we see. Many times we see the
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same individual again and again, going to work, shopping at the grocery store, or perhaps
crossing the campus, but how well do we remember him or her? Do the facial expressions a
person displays affect our memory for recognizing that person later? Do we happen to
remember a person we saw smiling, for example, more so than we remember a person we saw
frowning? The present research intends to investigate these issues and further explore the
relationship between memory for a person’s identity and his or her facial expressions.
Issues concerning factors that may influence our memory for a person’s identity are
relevant to the judicial system, especially with concern to eyewitness testimony. Eyewitnesses
are critical in solving crimes and sometimes eyewitness testimony is the only evidence available
for determining the identity of the culprit (Wells & Olson, 2003). In fact, it has been estimated
that in 77,000 criminal trials each year in the United States, the primary or sole evidence against
a defendant is eyewitness evidence, whether accurate or inaccurate (Wells, Small, Penrod,
Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). Unfortunately, research also indicates that eyewitness
error is the leading cause of wrongful convictions. For example, in the first 200 DNA
exoneration cases in the United States, eyewitness error occurred in 75% or more of the cases
(Scheck et al., 2000; Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).
The reliability of an identification is affected by two classes of variables—system
variables and estimator variables (Wells, 1978). System variables are those under the control of
the criminal justice system. These include instructions given to eyewitnesses before they
consider a lineup or photospread or the method by which members of the lineup other than the
suspect are chosen. Estimator variables are those beyond the control of the criminal justice
system and whose effects can only be estimated. One particular variable that has lead to
eyewitness identification error is a change in a culprit’s physical appearance from the time of the
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crime to the time of the recognition test. For example, after participants watched videotaped
reenactments of armed robberies, simple disguises, even those as minor as covering the culprit’s
hair, impaired eyewitness identification (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987). Something even as
seemingly insignificant as sunglasses can impair identification, however, the degree of
impairment is reduced if the same culprit wears sunglasses at the time of the recognition test
(Hockley, Hemsworth, & Consoli, 1999). These issues present a serious problem for the
criminal justice system because often the photos of criminal suspects used in police lineups are
several years old. Changes in appearance that occur naturally over time, as well as changes
intentionally made by a culprit, can have quite strong effects on recognition rates. For example,
Read, Vokey, and Hammersley (1990) found that participants made more recognition errors
when viewing photos of the same individuals taken two years later when the individual’s
appearance had naturally changed (i.e., aging, changes in facial hair) than when their appearance
remained largely the same.
Another important estimator variable that can influence eyewitness accuracy is the
emotionality surrounding the event (Leinfelt, 2004). Witnessing a crime is typically a very
frightening event. Although the influence of eyewitnesses’ emotional stress on identification
accuracy rates is inconclusive, several studies have suggested that this effect is likely to follow
the Yerkes-Dodson Law, where by very high and very low levels of arousal will impair memory
(Deffenbacher, 1983; Cutler et al., 1987).
Not only are the eyewitnesses in a heighted state of emotional arousal, but in many
circumstances culprits are typically highly aroused as well, and tend to display intense emotional
expressions. Does this intense facial expression make the culprit more memorable? Will seeing
that same culprit at a later date with a different expression alter an eyewitness’s ability to
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recognize that individual? Or, for example, when an eyewitness viewed a crime in which the
culprit predominantly displayed an intensely angry facial expression, will the eyewitness
recognize that same culprit displaying a neutral expression in the police line-up? A major
concern that will be addressed by the proposed research studies is the effect of an actor’s
emotional expression on an observer’s ability to accurately identify that same actor at a later
point in time.
Processing of Facial Information Associated with Person Identity and Emotional Expression:
Two Competing Perspectives
There exists, among researchers, a debate about whether the processing of information
specific to person identity and emotional expression influence each other and whether specific
and separate brain areas are associated with each process. For example, Bruce and Young
(1986) argued that while emotional expression may play a role in face perception, it plays a very
minor role in face recognition. That is, the actor’s expression may influence a person’s ability to
identify a stimulus as a face, but it may not necessarily help the person recall that face. In a
review of neuropsychological studies of patients with cerebral damage to brain areas associated
with face perception (i.e., lateral fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus) as well as patients
suffering from prosopagnosia, a rare disorder of face perception where the ability to recognize
person identity is impaired, Bruce and Young argued that there is a dissociation in the cognitive
and structural systems that the brain uses to encode and store information pertaining to person
identity and emotional expression. In other words, they proposed a conceptual framework for
face processing that consists of separate systems for the encoding (learning) and recognition of
person identity and emotional expression. Evidence for their viewpoint comes from studying
clinical cases in which patients with right cerebral hemisphere damage, who, depending on
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where in the brain the damage occurred, could identify people but not their emotional
expressions (Bruyer et al., 1983) or could identify emotional expressions but not people (Kurucz
& Feldmar, 1979). The fact that person identity and facial expression identification were not both
impaired from damage to a single area implies that the brain processes these two types of facial
information separately. If these two types of facial information were processed by a mechanism
associated with a single brain area, the authors argued that there should not be any dissociation
between them.
As a functional account, the Bruce and Young (1986) model does not incorporate a
neural topography of its separate components. More recently, however, Haxby, Hoffman, and
Gobbini (2000) proposed a neurological account of face perception that emphasized a distinction
between the representation of invariant and changeable aspects of faces. Specifically, the core
system is comprised of occipitotemporal regions in the extrastriate visual cortex and contains
two functionally and neurologically distinct pathways for the visual analysis of faces. One
pathway codes changeable facial properties such as emotional expression, lipspeech, and eye
gaze, and involves the inferior occipital gyri and superior temporal sulcus. The second pathway
codes invariant facial properties, such as person identity, and involves the inferior occipital gyri
and lateral fusiform gyrus. The degree of separation between the functional roles played by the
different regions in this system, however, is unclear.
Several neuropsychological studies of patients with unilateral cerebral lesions have
pointed to the same conclusion that perception of person identity and perception of facial
expression proceeds independently. Researchers have used brief lateral stimulus presentations to
investigate cerebral hemisphere differences in both normal subjects and in patients with lesions
(e.g., Strauss & Moscovitch, 1981; Etcoff, 1984). Patients with unilateral cerebral lesions
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demonstrated strong impairments that severely affected their identification of familiar faces or
their interpretation of facial expressions of emotion, depending on the exact location of the
cerebral damage. These studies have shown that although the right cerebral hemisphere makes
an important contribution to analyses of both person identity and emotional expression, the
region of the right hemisphere responsible for processing information relevant to a person’s
identity seems to be separate from the region that processes emotional expression information
(see Etcoff, 1985, for a review).
Although the Bruce and Young (1986) model supports separate processing of person
identity and emotional expression information, researchers have recently argued that while some
separation exists, these processes may not operate completely independently of one another.
Specifically, Calder and Young (2005) refuted the idea of completely different pathways by
suggesting that conclusions drawn from clinical studies involving patients with disorders such as
prosopagnosia or patients with some sort of cerebral damage, are over-simplifications. Calder
and Young posited that in order to provide support for independent systems, patients would have
to lose the ability to recognize people but not emotional expressions, or lose the ability to
recognize emotional expressions but not people. For example, cases of prosopagnosia without
impaired facial expression recognition would support the independence of identity processing,
however, remarkably few prosopagnosics show well-preserved facial expression recognition. In
fact, on formal testing, most such patients show impairments of facial expression recognition as
well. Thus, it may be that there is an extensive arrangement of neural systems that communicate
and cognitively process person identity and facial expression in a similar fashion.
Although neural topographical models of face perception with separate pathways for the
processing of person identity and facial expression information have been proposed, empirical
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support for these models is lacking. While Haxby and colleagues (2000) described wide
distinctions between the systems that process person identity and changeable facial cues,
relatively few functional imaging and cell-recording studies have investigated the processing of
person identity and emotional expression in a single experiment (Calder & Young, 2005).
Functional imaging investigations have consistently identified occipitotemporal regions as being
activated by identity recognition, however, the results have been less consistent regarding the
brain areas that are involved in expression recognition (Narumoto et al., 2001). Although fMRI
techniques seem to support the idea that there is a degree of neural separation between the
mechanisms involved in person identity and emotional expression recognition, such studies have
contributed little to identifying how the person identity route separates from the emotional
expression route.
Although some researchers point to evidence from a neural topographical perspective to
describe the degree of separation between the processing of person identity information and
emotional expression information, others prefer a more statistical approach. For example, Calder
and Young (2005) used principle component analysis (PCA) to explore the relationship between
the processing of person identity and facial expression information. PCA involves a
mathematical procedure that transforms a number of possibly correlated variables into a smaller
grouping of uncorrelated variables called principal components (Pearson, 1901). The first
principal component accounts for as much variability in the data as possible, and each
succeeding component accounts for unique portions of the remaining variability. Using this
technique, the independent perception of person identity and facial expression arises from an
image-based analysis of faces with no explicit mechanism for routing identity- or expressionrelevant cues to different systems (Calder et al., 2001). PCA-based systems can reliably extract
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and categorize facial cues to identity and expression. Recent work has shown that a PCA of
emotional expressions posed by different actors generated distinct sets of principle components
coding expression and identity, and others that coded both of these facial cues together.
Moreover, this partial independence of the principle components was sufficient to model the
independent perception of facial identity and expression. In addition, the partial overlap for
facial identity and expression offers a potential explanation for the incidences where facial
identity and expression produced interference effects (Calder & Young, 2005). In other words,
independent perception does not need to rely on totally separate visual codes for these facial
cues.
Emotional Expression Influences Perception of Person Identity
Several studies have been designed to explore the role that emotional expression plays in
our perception of familiarity for others. Ganel and Goshen-Gottstein (2004) used a speededclassification task to demonstrate that familiarity—knowing who a person is—increased the
perceptual interconnectedness of identity and expression information. Specifically, participants
viewed a series of familiar and unfamiliar actors displaying happy and angry emotional
expressions and classified emotional expressions as being positive or negative while ignoring
identity information (whether the face was familiar or unfamiliar), or classified faces as familiar
or unfamiliar while ignoring expression information. Participants were quicker and made fewer
classification errors for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces for both identity and expression
judgments. These findings are particularly interesting because the dimensions of identity and
expression were equally discriminable, thus implying that this interference can only be attributed
to participants’ ability to classify person identity given a unique expression and cannot be easily
dismissed as an artifact of a fast dimension interfering with the processing of a slower one.
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Other researchers exploring this link between emotional expressions and how quickly and
efficiently we process a person’s identity explain that the amount of exposure we have to a
person displaying a specific emotion may have a direct effect on ratings of familiarity. For
example, Endo, Endo, Kirita, and Maruyama (1992) demonstrated that celebrities were more
recognizable when seen displaying a positive expression rather than a negative one. The
researchers suggested that this positive advantage may be due to the amount and type of
exposure we have to such faces. In other words, most of the time we see celebrities smiling,
whether on television or in magazines, and therefore they are more familiar to us when they
display a positive expression than when they display a negative one.
Similarly, other researchers have observed that a smile increased feelings of familiarity
for both unknown and famous faces (Baudouin, Gilbert, Sansone and Tiberghien, 2000). Across
two studies, participants observed famous and unknown persons with smiling and neutral
expressions, and categorized these faces as being famous or unknown and indicated how familiar
they found each face to be. Results from these studies suggest a direct association between
familiarity and expression processing such that a positive expression bias was found for both
familiar and unfamiliar faces. In other words, the smile increased feelings of familiarity for both
unfamiliar and familiar faces. Because unfamiliar faces do not hold a retrievable memory trace
in long-term memory, the smiling bias cannot be attributed to a structural effect at the matching
level between the visual input and the representation of faces in long-term memory. Instead, the
smiling bias most likely occurred at the decision-making stage. Even if we can successfully
identify faces without interference from emotional expressions, some information about
emotional expression can, in some conditions, influence a decision about familiarity.
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In addition to the familiarity that positive faces may contribute to face perception, there is
also the possibility that positive faces may somehow provide an advantage in the identification
and categorization of emotional expressions. Leppanen and Hietanen (2004) explored this
possibility by having participants compare pictures of actual faces with schematic drawings of
faces with a single feature such as an upturned mouth line. Across both studies and regardless of
stimulus type (actual photographs or schematic drawings), participants reliably recognized happy
expressions faster than they recognized angry ones. In order to investigate whether low-level
processing of one particular feature of the face (e.g., the upturned curve of the mouth)
contributed to the happy face advantage, participants in a third study categorized only the mouths
used in the schematic drawings as being upturned, straight, or downturned. Participants were no
quicker at classifying upturned lines rather than downturned lines, thus suggesting that the
positive face advantage reflects a higher-level asymmetry in the recognition and categorization
of emotionally positive and negative signals.
Though there is an advantage for happy faces in recognition tasks, angry or fearful
expressions are often more easily detected. For example, angry faces are better noticed in a
crowd, which could have an evolutionary survival basis (Vuilleumier et al., 2001). In a series of
experiments, Hansen and Hansen (1988) documented an asymmetry in the processing of
emotional expressions embedded in crowds. In these studies, participants were given the task of
surveying crowds for the presence of a discrepant face. Across three studies, participants were
faster at detecting an angry face from among happy crowds than they were at detecting a happy
face among an angry crowd. Threatening faces pop out of crowds, perhaps as a result of a
preattentive search for signals of direct threat.
Emotional Expression Influences Memory for Person Identity
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Although there has been considerable work done in order to determine the effect of
emotional expression on how recognizable or familiar we find others, very few studies have been
directly aimed at investigating the influence emotional expression has on memory for new faces.
Memory can be measured in one of several ways including, for example, recall tests,
reconstruction tests, and recognition tests (Danziger, 2008), although not all measures of
memory are applicable to facial stimuli. In recall tests, individuals rehearse a list of items and
then reproduce that list as best as they can remember. The order that the individual recalls the
list of items is not important. In reconstruction tasks, on the other hand, order is vital.
Individuals are given a list of items to remember in the specific order in which they were
presented. At test, individuals are presented with the studied items and are required to arrange
those items in the order they were originally presented. Recognition tasks, however, are
somewhat different from reconstruction and recall tasks. In recognition tasks, individuals are
asked to remember a list of words or pictures, for example, and then identify the previously
studied words or pictures from among a list of alternatives, or distracters, that were not present in
the original list.
While each of these memory measures has its own unique benefit, only one is applicable
to the study of memory for person identity and emotional expression. Because of the intricate
nature of facial stimuli, recall memory tasks using this variety of stimuli are too difficult and, for
this reason, inappropriate. Although images of actors displaying various facial expressions could
be used as stimuli in a reconstructive memory task, a study employing a task of this nature could
be said to be lacking in real-world applicability. The proposed studies, therefore, will employ
recognition memory tasks to explore the influence of emotional expression on memory for
person identity. Recognition memory tasks using facial stimuli best match real life experiences
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(e.g., see Wells & Olsen, 2003, for a review of memory strategies used in eye-witness testimony
literature).
Several of the earliest studies exploring the influence of emotional expressions on
memory for person identity have demonstrated that positive expressions significantly increase
person identity recognition. Kottoor (1989), one of the earliest researchers on the topic, designed
a recognition memory study in which participants studied a set of photographs of actors
displaying either happy, neutral, or pouting facial expressions. Participants then identified these
same photographs from a set of photographs containing the previously seen photographs as well
as photographs of new actors. Participants were better at recognizing photographs of actors
displaying smiling expressions as compared to actors displaying neutral expressions or pouting
expressions, thus providing direct evidence of a relationship between emotional expression and
person identity recognition. In a similar study, Cohen-Pager and Brosgole (1992) had
participants study photographs of actors displaying happy and neutral expressions. At
recognition, participants chose between two photographs—the photograph they saw at inspection
along with a photograph of a different individual (two-person condition), or the photograph they
saw at inspection along with a photograph of the same individual displaying a different
expression (two-expression condition). Participants made significantly more recognition errors
in the two-expression condition than in the two-person condition, and their memory for smiling
expressions was better than that for neutral expressions in both the two-person and twoexpression conditions. These studies are important in the fact that they provide preliminary
evidence for the role of emotional expression in memory for person identity. Specifically, both
studies suggest that a recognition memory advantage exists for faces previously seen displaying
a positive emotional expression.
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Each of these studies, however, has included a fairly obvious weakness that poses a
problem for proper interpretation. With regard to identity memory, the use of the same stimulus
(e.g., photograph) at both inspection and test poses a problem. The recognition of an identical
photograph and the recognition of a person are two quite different tasks. Bruce (1982) explained
that when we see a photograph of a face we generate a pictorial code which includes elements
such as lighting, grain, and perhaps even flaws that the photograph might possess. When the
same photograph is presented at test, it is difficult to distinguish memory for person identity from
memory for the pictorial code generated at inspection. Another major drawback to using the
same picture at inspection and at test is that memory for facial expression cannot be assessed
independently of identity because the same expression for a particular face would be seen at
inspection and at test.
In an effort to test memory for emotional expression and person identity separately,
D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, Comblain, & Etienne (2003a) conducted a study in which
participants saw different photographs of the same actor at inspection and at test—each actor
displayed a positive or a negative expression at inspection and a neutral expression at test. Thus,
participants never saw the same photograph more than once, ensuring that participants were
recognizing individuals, not photographs. By utilizing this research paradigm, D’Argembeau
and his colleagues were better able to determine whether participants recognized the actors and
whether participants remembered which emotional expression the actor displayed at inspection.
Participants indicated first whether they recognized the actor in the photograph. If the actor was
recognized, the participant then indicated which facial expression that actor previously
displayed. D’Argembeau et al. discovered that participants recognized significantly more actors
previously seen with a positive expression than with a negative expression. To explain this
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happy face advantage, it was suggested that people more readily encode positive information
rather than negative information when it provides some type of self-relevance (e.g., an increase
in positive affect after viewing a photograph of a happy actor). Memory for emotional
expressions, however, was similar for happy or angry faces.
Using this very same paradigm, reliable results have been found for person identity
recognition such that recognition accuracy was significantly higher for actors who were seen
with a happy rather than an angry expression at inspection (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,
2004; D’Argembeau et al., 2003a; D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, Etienne, & Comblain,
2003b). Results for memory for facial expression, however, are inconclusive in that several
studies have found better memory for positive rather than negative expressions (D’Argembeau et
al., 2003b; Shimamura, Ross, & Bennett, 2006), while other studies have found no differences
whatsoever (D’Argembeau et al., 2003a; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004).
The happy expression advantage for person identity recognition holds even when direct
attention is not paid to the emotional expression being displayed. To demonstrate this,
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2007) designed a study in which participants, during a initial
task, attended to the actor’s physical characteristics (i.e., nose size), trait information (i.e.,
intelligence), or the emotional expression. Participants recognized more actors after attending to
the actor’s personality or emotional expression than physical characteristics. These findings
suggest that, when participants view a face as a whole (i.e., to make a decision about whether the
actor is intelligent or to determine the affect displayed in an emotional expression), emotional
expressions influence person recognition automatically, regardless of whether specific attention
is being paid to the expression or its possible meaning. Participants’ memory for emotional
expressions, however, was best after participants attended to the actor’s expression displayed by
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actors, suggesting that emotional expression information is not automatically stored in our
memory and must be paid specific attention in order to be properly stored. Again, memory for
expression was not different for happy or angry faces, regardless of the type of information that
participants attended to when viewing the actors.
Although the above-mentioned studies have reinforced the idea that positive expressions
significantly increase person identity recognition, there seems to be an important piece missing
in this literature concerning the memory processes involved in this relationship between
emotional expressions and person identity recognition. Memory processing is divided into three
stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval (Tulving, 1972). Encoding allows information that is
from the outside world to reach our senses in the forms of chemical and physical stimuli.
Encoding also requires that the perceived item of use or interest be converted into a construct
that can be stored within the brain and recalled later from short term or long-term memory.
Storage is the second process and involves the creation of a permanent record of the encoded
information. Finally, retrieval includes calling back the stored information in response to a cue
in the environment for use in a process or activity (Tulving, 1972, 1983). In previous studies,
participants viewed happy and angry faces at inspection (encoding), and only neutral faces at test
(retrieval) (D’Argembeau et al., 2003a; D’Argembeau et al., 2003b; D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2004; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2007). This presents a problem for the
interpretation of previous findings because it is unclear at which stage of processing that
emotional expressions exert their influence on person identity recognition. In other words, we
only know about the relationship between emotional expression and memory for a person’s
identity for situations in which emotional expression information is available when participants
encode actor’s faces. Experiment 1 was designed to explore whether emotional expression
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information enhances person identity recognition only when such information is presented at
inspection (the expression may help us to process or learn the face in a special way), or whether
emotional expression information enhances person identity recognition even when such
information is presented at test (the expression may help us to retrieve the memory trace).
Specifically, participants saw either happy and angry expressions or neutral expressions at
inspection. Those participants who viewed happy and angry faces at inspection then saw neutral
faces at test while those who viewed neutral faces at inspection then saw happy and angry faces
at test. Because stimuli have to be converted into meaningful bits of information to be
successfully stored in memory (Tulving, 1972), it was hypothesized that emotional expressions
would influence person identity recognition when emotional expression information was present
only when facial information was encoded.
Along with exploring whether emotional expression information enhances person identity
recognition when emotional expressions are seen at inspection or at test, Experiment 1 is unique
because of its inclusion of a simple, yet direct measure of judgment confidence. Confidence
ratings have been measured in past studies using the Remember/Know/Guess option format
(D’Argembeau et al., 2003b; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2007). Adapted from Gardiner,
Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (1998), participants were instructed to give a “Remember”
response to any face that brought back to mind something they had consciously experienced, a
“Know” response to faces that felt familiar, and “Guess” responses if they were unsure whether
or not the face had been presented at inspection. This particular methodology is problematic
because of the somewhat confusing nature of the response categories. Also, the
Remember/Know paradigm, which was adapted into the Remember/Know/Guess paradigm, was
originally designed to explore the different states of consciousness associated with memory
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retrieval (Tulving, 1985). Because confidence in memory retrieval is considerably different than
a state of consciousness associated with memory retrieval, using the Remember/Know/Guess
paradigm we miss information pertaining to a direct reflection of participants’ confidence.
Experiment 1 measured participants’ confidence of the decisions they made using a 7-point scale
with anchors of 0 (not at all) and 6 (very much). It was expected that by choosing a simple, yet
direct, measure of judgment confidence, we could enhance our understanding of the judgment
process.
Another possible drawback to the current literature is that the influence of emotional
expressions on identity recognition has been limited to only happy and angry expressions. In
order to replicate and extend previous findings, Experiment 2 was designed to include a variety
of facial expressions at inspection. In order to further explore the complexity of the facial
decoding processes underlying the recognition of particular emotions, Experiment 2 not only
included happy and angry faces at inspection, but also included expressions of sadness, disgust,
fear, and surprise.1
In order to fully understand the nature of the relationship between emotional expression
and memory for a person’s identity, it is necessary to investigate the different decoding strategies
associated with recognizing various emotional expressions. Research has demonstrated that we
infer what others are feeling by a quick, automatic processing of their facial expression
information. However, there exists a debate in the literature about the cognitive mechanisms
associated with this automatic processing. Theorists supporting a categorical processing of facial
expression information have postulated a set of basic emotion categories, each including a set of
emotion words for each emotion category (e.g., Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982; Izard,
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A study by Shimamura et al. (2006) included multiple emotional expressions; however, this study will not be
discussed in detail because its methodology is not informative or relevant to that of Experiment 2.
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1971). Although the emotion words in each category as well as the associated emotional
expressions may differ in intensity, different facial behaviors are associated with each of the
separate overlying emotional categories. According to this theory, the diversity of human facial
expressivity is systemized using prototype expressions that correspond to these categories.
These prototypes are configurations of facial-feature movements, produced by well-defined
combinations of muscle contractions (Ekman, 1982). For example, a person who is ecstatic
about winning the lottery is experiencing a much more intense emotion than a person feeling a
slight sense of accomplishment after completing a difficult school assignment. Categorical
perception theorists would argue that both of these affective states fall within the “happy”
category, and although they differ in intensity, the configuration of the facial features as well as
the action patterns of facial muscle movements would be similar.
Dimensional theorists, in contrast, suggest that facial expressions of emotion are
recognized based on their association with dimensions underlying the structure of emotion
(Katsikitis, 1997; Russell, 1997). Based on factor analysis and multidimensional scaling
techniques, the recognition of facially expressed emotion has commonly been represented by two
dimensions (e.g., valence and facial dominance, Katsikitis, 1997; valence and arousal, Russell,
1997). The dimensions are said to represent two independent factors that are common to all
emotions and emotional expressions and can be arranged to form a two-dimensional emotion
space such that any single emotion judgment reflects the individual’s simultaneous assessment of
both dimensions. Although researchers on the topic often disagree about the dimensions that
make up this emotion space, researchers generally agree that variations among expressions is a
function of each expression’s alignment in the emotion space created by the dimensions that
constitute it, rather than its membership in a discrete emotion category.
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Very little research has directly compared the conscious use of categorical or dimensional
decoding strategies when recognizing facial expressions of emotion. Only one such piece has
begun to explore these effects by testing whether the type or completeness of an emotional
expression contributes to the ease at which participants use either a categorical or dimensional
judgment strategy to recognize a facially expressed emotion (Mendolia, 2007). Specifically,
participants viewed actors displaying each of the basic emotions, which varied in intensity. The
images included either complete expressions (expressions that were not altered in any way) or
partial expressions. Partial expressions were made from the composite of either an upper blend
of an emotion and a neutral image or a lower blend of an emotion and neutral image. In other
words, participants saw complete expressions, partial expressions where the upper half of the
face displayed an emotional expression while the bottom half was displaying a neutral
expression, or the opposite of this. After viewing each face, participants identified the emotional
expression using either an affect grid style format (dimensional approach) or a list of emotion
discrete categories (categorical approach). Results demonstrated that participants could
consciously employ both strategies quite well. Participants, however, judged the complete
expressions more accurately using the categorical approach especially when viewing fearful,
disgusted, and surprised expressions. These findings seem to suggest that individuals are more
effective at consciously using the categorical approach rather than the dimensional approach to
decoding facial expressions when all features fit an emotion prototype. Participants, however,
were more effective at employing a dimensional decoding strategy rather than a categorical
decoding strategy for partial expressions, or when facial expressions were ambiguous.
Therefore, it could be concluded from the evidence described here that individuals are quite able
at using both categorical and dimensional strategies when recognizing facial expressions,
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however, individuals choose the strategy that best fits the stimulus presented to them. Because
of this evidence that participants use dimensional and categorical strategies differentially, it was
necessary for Experiment 2 to include emotional expressions that represent both of this
strategies.
The classification of emotional expressions is also influenced by the location and
distinctiveness of expression-consistent features (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000; Wallbott
& Ricci-Bitti, 1993), as well as the extent to which those expression-consistent features are
characteristic for more than one emotion category (Ekman et al., 1982). For example, lower face
cues, including movement in the mouth area, influenced raters’ judgments of emotions such as
anger, disgust, and happiness, whereas upper face cues, predominantly associated with eyebrow
movement, influenced judgments of surprise, fear, and sadness (Katsikitis, 1997). Experiment 2
included this extensive list of emotions associated with unique decoding strategies to examine
whether each emotional expression has unique influences on person identity recognition
accuracy.
In order to simulate real life events (e.g., seeing someone for the first time), an incidental
learning condition was chosen for both Experiments 1 and 2. Using an incidental learning
procedure, participants were presented with photographs of actors on a computer screen and
were asked to make decisions about the possible interests or preferences of the actors depicted in
the photographs. Following a brief distraction task, participants’ memory for recognizing the
actors was tested.

	
  

20	
  

	
  

	
  

EXPERIMENT 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to explore whether emotional expressions have to be
encoded in order to influence memory for person identity. Specifically, participants were
assigned to one of two encoding conditions—emotional expressions at inspection or neutral faces
at inspection. Those participants who viewed emotional expressions at inspection viewed neutral
expressions at test, whereas participants who viewed neutral expressions at inspection viewed
emotional expressions at test. It was hypothesized that in order for emotional expressions to
affect person identity recognition then facial expressions must be encoded at inspection. In other
words, actors initially seen displaying a positive expression should be better recognized than
actors seen with a negative expression. Actors initially seen displaying a neutral expression
should be recognized equally as well when later seen with a positive or a negative expression.
Method
Participants and design. Participants included 227 undergraduate students enrolled in
psychology courses at the University of Mississippi (71.1% women, mean age of 20.1 yr.), who
received partial course credit in exchange for their participation. Participants who volunteered to
participate were randomly assigned to condition. The experiment consisted of a 2 (encoding
condition: emotional expressions and neutral expressions at inspection) × 2 (facial expression:
happy and angry) mixed-model design with encoding condition as a between-participants factor
and facial expression as a within-participants factor.
Materials. All aspects of the present study were presented using SuperLab software on
standard Dell computer systems. Participant responses were made on a standard Cedrus 7-button
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response pad. Stimuli were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF;
Lundqvist, Flykt, &Öhman, 1998). This carefully controlled database includes faces that have
been photographed from the same distance, with the background of the photographs, the lighting
conditions, and the clothes worn by the actors portrayed being identical across all images.
Photographs of 54 actors (27 males and 27 females) were selected, with each individual being
portrayed with three different expressions (neutral, happy, and angry). In all pictures, face
orientation was directed (facing forward). To control for peripheral facial cue influences on
recognition accuracy rates, photographs of actors were cropped in such a way that only internal
facial features were visible. Thirty-six faces were presented at inspection (18 happy expressions
and 18 angry expressions in the emotional expressions at inspection condition, 36 neutral faces
in the neutral expressions at inspection condition), and the remaining 18 faces were used as
distracters for the recognition test (faces used as studied or nonstudied items were
counterbalanced across participants). Sex of the actors presented at both inspection and test was
balanced across conditions. In the emotional expressions at inspection condition, each studied
face was seen with a happy expression by half the participants and with an angry expression by
the other half, to control for the possibility of differences in the memorability of particular actors.
Similarly, in the neutral expressions at inspection condition, each test face was seen with a happy
expression by half the participants and with an angry expression by the other half. Faces were
presented in a random order as to control for possible order effects within conditions.
Procedure. After arriving at the lab and providing informed consent, the participant sat
in a chair 24 inches in front of a 17-inch computer monitor. The experimenter stated in a cover
story that the objective of the study was to investigate social perception skill. The experimenter
told the participant that by studying social perception skill, researchers can better understand
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how people relate to one another. The experimenter explained to the participant that he or she
would see a number of photographed faces displayed on the screen, and that each person’s
expression was in response to an event. The experimenter instructed the participant to indicate
whether the person exhibited various personality traits, based on his or her impressions of the
person depicted in the photograph. The actual purpose of this task was to expose the participant
to photographs of actors displaying either emotional expressions or neutral expressions,
depending on condition, without instructing the participant to intentionally remember the actors.
After completing two practice trials, the experimenter left the room and the participant
began the face-perception task. A red fixation cross appeared on the screen for approximately 1
s in order to draw the participant’s attention to the center of the computer monitor. Once the
cross disappeared, the participant saw a photograph of an actor for 5 s. Once the photograph left
the screen, the participant saw a personality descriptor (e.g. organized, intelligent, logical)
displayed on the screen for 3 s along with a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very
much). Participants selected the rating on the scale that best represented his or her perception of
the person in the photograph and pressed the corresponding button on the response pad. After 3
s the computer automatically advanced to the next trial, even if the participant did not make a
response, ensuring that the time between each trial was uniform for all participants. The
participant completed 36 trials in this task. Personality traits were randomized to ensure that an
actor was not associated with any one specific personality trait. No actual measurements were
recorded during this task because its sole purpose was to expose participants to images of the
actors.
After the participant completed the face-perception task, the experimenter returned to the
room and stated that the next task served as another assessment of visual perceptual processes,
	
  

23	
  

	
  

	
  

specifically, the perception of color. The experimenter stated that the purpose of the task was to
examine whether strategies a person uses to read people are similar to those that a person might
use to perceive other stimuli, for example, colors.
While alone, the participant saw a color patch displayed on the screen for 5 s, followed
by a color wheel displayed for 4 s. The color wheel was divided into six equal sections. Each
section was labeled from 1 to 6 and represented one of the major colors of the color wheel. In
the allotted 4 s, the participant used the response pad to select the corresponding section of the
color wheel that best matched the previously displayed color patch. After making this first
judgment, the participant had 4 s to indicate how confident he or she was of the decision by
using the response pad to select the corresponding rating on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (not
at all) to 6 (very much). This particular confidence rating was included in order to familiarize
the participant with the confidence scale to be used in the following recognition-memory task. In
order to control for time, each screen in the distraction task was programmed to advance
automatically after the allotted time for each trial, regardless of the participants’ response. The
participant completed 12 color trials, thus making the distraction task approximately 2.5 min.
Again, no actual measurements were recorded in this task. In actuality, this task served as a
distraction task designed to provide a controlled delay between the initial exposure to the
photographs of the actors in the face-perception task and the recognition-memory task to follow.
Immediately following the distraction task, the participant completed a surprise
recognition-memory task. For each trial the participant saw a photograph displayed on the
computer screen. As quickly as possible, the participant indicated by clicking a “yes” or “no”
button designated on the response box whether he or she recognized the actor from the faceperception task. Participants in the emotional expressions at inspection condition saw 54
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photographs of actors displaying neutral expressions—the 36 actors from the face-perception
task as well as 18 distracter photographs of actors they had not previously seen. Participants in
the neutral expressions at inspection condition saw 54 photographs of actors displaying happy or
angry facial expressions—the 36 actors from the face-perception task (half of which displayed a
happy expression, half an angry expression) and 18 distracter photographs of actors they had not
previously seen (again, half of which displayed a happy expression, half an angry expression).
For each of these judgments, reaction times were measured and the participant indicated how
confident he or she was about each judgment by using the response pad to select the
corresponding rating on a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
The recognition-memory task was self-paced. Computer software measured responses for
participants’ accuracy, reaction times, and confidence levels for person identity recognition.
After completing the recognition-memory task, participants were fully debriefed and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 1 was designed to explore whether emotional expression information
enhances person identity recognition when such information is presented at inspection (i.e., the
expression helps us to process or learn the face in a special way) or at test (i.e., the new
expression information helps us to retrieve the memory trace). It was hypothesized that
emotional expressions would influence person identity recognition when they were presented at
encoding (emotional expressions at inspection condition) rather than recognition (neutral
expressions at encoding condition). In other words, actors seen with a positive expression at
inspection should be better recognized when displaying a neutral face at test than actors who
were seen displaying a negative expression at inspection. Actors displaying neutral expressions
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at inspection should be recognized equally as well when seen with either a positive expression or
a negative expression at test.
Participants’ recognition accuracy was assessed using Wagner’s (1993) method for
calculating unbiased hit rates and chance values. Wagner’s unbiased hit rate is posited to more
accurately reflect participants’ performance than simple hit rates alone because it takes into
account the number of times a participant correctly identified an actor that was present in the
previous face-perception task (simple hit rate) in conjunction with how often the participant used
a response category (i.e. “yes” or “no”). Simple hit rates provide misleading information by not
taking into consideration the number of times a participant incorrectly used a particular response
category (false alarms). For example, if a participant selects “yes” for every trial in a recognition
memory task, a simple hit rate would indicate that the participant performed at 100% accuracy.
This is not correct, however, because even though this participant recognized all the actors from
the previous task he also incorrectly identified all the foils. Based on Wagner’s method,
unbiased hit rates were calculated for each participant using the following formula:
!!    =   
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For Wagner’s method, an unbiased hit rate of “1”, for example, indicates that a participant
correctly identified each previously seen actor and only used the response category “yes” when it
was appropriate to do so. Chance values, on the other hand, were calculated by taking into
account the likelihood that a certain stimulus and response category will co-occur by chance
given the participant’s response pattern. In other words, chance values were calculated as
follows:
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Each participant’s unbiased hit rate was compared to his or her chance value rather than to a
standard chance value of .5 based on the 2-option response format of the recognition judgment.
Using Wagner’s chance values are more appropriate because participants may have been biased
in their use of one response type over the other, and Wagner’s method takes into consideration
each participant’s response pattern when considering chance value.
Paired t-tests were performed to compare unbiased hit rates and chance values in order to
explore whether participants were performing at or above chance (see Table 1). In all cases
participants performed at a level exceeding their own chance values, thus suggesting that
participants were not responding in a random fashion (all ps < .001). Finally, in order to quantify
each participant’s performance above his or her chance level, difference scores were calculated
for each participant by subtracting chance values from unbiased hit rates.
A 2 (encoding condition: emotion expressions at inspection, neutral expressions at
inspection) × 2 (facial expression: happy, angry) analysis of variance performed on difference
scores (unbiased hit rates − chances rates) to explore the influence of encoding condition and
emotional expression on participants’ ability to recognize the actors revealed a main effect of
emotional expression, which was qualified by a significant interaction of emotional expression
and encoding condition. Whether participants initially saw actors displaying an emotional or a
neutral expression in combination with whether they were happy or angry altered their ability to
recognize the actor, F(1, 225) = 7.5, p < . 01, and their quickness to make, F(1, 225) = 6.7, p < .
01, and confidence in the judgment, F(1, 225) = 4.6, p < . 05 (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). Pairwise
comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments revealed that, contrary to predictions, after initially
seeing actors displaying neutral expressions, participants recognized more actors and were
quicker to make and more confident about their judgments when actors were displaying an angry
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rather than a happy expression. Participants who viewed actors displaying happy and angry
expressions at inspection recognized those same actors equally as well when seen displaying
neutral expressions (p = .55). Likewise, participants in the emotional expressions at encoding
condition made recognition judgments for actors previously seen displaying happy expressions
no quicker (p = .94) or more confidently (p = .26) than judgments for actors previously seen
displaying angry expressions.
The results from the present study suggest that emotional expressions influence memory
for a person’s identity, but only when the expression information is available at the time of
recognition. In other words, when emotional expressions were present during the recognition
test, participants’ accuracy rates were higher for actors displaying angry expressions as
compared to happy expressions. When emotional expression information was available at
inspection, however, this added piece of information encoded for each actor did not seem to
influence participants’ memory for those actors. Participants in this condition remembered
equally as many actors displaying neutral expressions who were previously seen with a happy
expression as they did actors displaying angry expressions.
One possible explanation for participants’ increased recognition accuracy rates for actors
displaying negative expressions could be that participants viewed the actors’ neutral expressions
during inspection as being more negative rather than neutral. Functional neuroimaging studies
on emotion as well as emotion categorization studies have demonstrated that prototypical
“neutral” faces are often evaluated as being negative (i.e., Lee et al., 2008; Baggott, Palermo, &
Fox, 2011). If it is the case that participants in the present study viewed the neutral faces as
being negative, state dependent learning theory would suggest that actors seen displaying a
negative expression at test would be more readily recognized than actors displaying a positive
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expression (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Godden & Baddeley, 1980). In other words, the
negative emotion participants associated with the neutral expressions of the actors seen at
inspection may have made those same actors seem more familiar when displaying angry
expressions at test because of the consistency of emotion state associated with each expression.
To explore this hypothesis, Experiment 2 was designed to include a measure of perceived
emotionality for each face seen at inspection. If it is the case that participants are viewing the
neutral expressions as being more negative than neutral, and this negative emotion associated
with the neutral expressions seen at inspection is boosting recognition rates for actors seen with a
negative expression at test, then participants in the neutral expression at encoding condition in
Experiment 2 should show higher recognition rates not only for angry faces, but also for other
negative expressions as well.
Another purpose for including this second judgment in Experiment 2 was to double the
exposure time for faces seen during inspection. Although participants in Experiment 1 were
performing at a level significantly higher than chance, recognition rates were low across all
expressions (unbiased hit rates ranged from 4% to 8% above chance rates, see Table 1).
Allowing participants to view each of the faces during the face-perception task for 10 s instead of
5 s was intended to increase recognition accuracy in Experiment 2.
Finally, to further investigate the role of emotion in the encoding and recognition of
person identity, Experiment 2 maintained the two encoding conditions of Experiment 1. In an
attempt to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 included a more
comprehensive list of emotions in order to examine whether emotional expressions with different
decoding strategies have unique influences on person identity recognition rates. While
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Experiment 1 only included the emotions of happiness and anger, Experiment 2 was designed to
include the emotions of happiness, anger, fear, sadness, surprise and disgust.
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EXPERIMENT 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate and extend Experiment 1 by including a
more extensive list of emotions, a list which included six basic emotions. Experiment 2 included
a more comprehensive list of emotions in order to examine whether emotional expressions with
different decoding strategies have unique influences on person identity recognition rates. In
order to further investigate whether emotional expression information enhances person identity
recognition when presented at inspection or when presented at test, participants in an emotional
expressions at encoding condition saw a series of actors displaying happy, sad, angry, scared,
surprised and disgusted facial expressions at inspection, and saw those same actors, along with
actors they have never seen before, displaying neutral expressions at test. Participants in the
neutral expressions at encoding condition saw a series of actors displaying neutral expressions at
inspection, and saw those same actors, along with actors they have never seen before, displaying
happy, sad, angry, scared, surprised and disgusted facial expressions at test. Based on previous
findings that actors previously seen displaying a positive rather than negative expression are
better recognized when later seen displaying a neutral expression (i.e., D’Argembeau et al.,
2003a; D’Argembeau et al., 2003b; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; D’Argembeau &
Van der Linden, 2007), and because classification accuracy rates are highest for happy
expressions (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000; Wallbott & Ricci-Bitti, 1993), it was
hypothesized that participants’ person identity accuracy rates will be highest for actors
previously seen displaying a happy expression. Lastly, the further investigate participants’
higher recognition accuracy rates for actors displaying negative expressions in the neutral
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expressions at encoding condition of Experiment 1 and in an attempt to boost recognition
accuracy ratings, Experiment 2 included a measure of perceived emotion displayed by each of
the actors. Specifically, participants were exposed to actors in the face-perception task a second
time, and asked to rate the emotion displayed by each of the actors. If it is the case that
participants are viewing the neutral expressions as being negative, and this negative emotion
associated with the neutral expressions seen at inspection is boosting recognition rates for actors
seen with a negative expression at test, then participants in the neutral expression at encoding
condition should show higher recognition rates not only for angry faces, but also for sad and
disgusted faces as well.
Method
Participants and design. Participants included 174 undergraduate students enrolled in
psychology courses at the University of Mississippi (78.7% women, mean age of 19.9 yr.), who
received partial course credit in exchange for their participation. Participants who volunteered to
participate were randomly assigned to condition. The experiment consisted of a 2 (encoding
condition: emotional expressions and neutral expressions at inspection) × 6 (facial expression:
happy, angry, sad, scared, surprised, and disgusted) mixed-model design with encoding condition
as a between-participants factor and facial expression as a within-participants factor.
Materials. Again, stimuli were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces
(Lundqvist et al., 1998). While Experiment 1 used 54 actors, photographs of 36 actors (18 males
and 18 females) were selected for Experiment 2, with each individual being portrayed with seven
different expressions (neutral, happy, angry, sad, scared, surprised, and disgusted). Twenty-four
faces were presented at study (four of each emotional expression), and the remaining twelve
faces were used as distracters for the recognition test (faces used as studied or nonstudied items
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were counterbalanced across participants). Each studied face was seen with a randomly selected
expression, thus ensuring that the effect of facial expression was not confounded by differences
in the memorability of particular facial identities.
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with
the exception that all participants made two judgments of each actor during the face-perception
task. First, participants completed the same personality trait judgment as in Experiment 1. The
second judgment was a rating of perceived emotion for each actor’s expression. For each trial, a
red fixation cross appeared on the screen for approximately 1 s in order to draw the participant’s
attention to the center of the computer monitor. Once the cross disappeared, the participant saw a
photograph of an actor for 5 s. Once the photograph left the screen, the participant saw a 7-point
scale with anchors of 0 (negative) and 6 (positive) for 3 s. Each participant indicated the degree
to which he or she perceived the individual’s facial expression to be either positive or negative
by selecting the appropriate rating on the scale provided. Again, after 3 s the computer
automatically advanced to the next trial, even if the participant did not make a response, ensuring
that the time between each trial was uniform for all participants. Participants completed the first
judgment for all actors in the face-perception task and then saw each face a second time in order
to complete the second judgment. The order in which participants completed these two
judgments of the face-perception task was counterbalanced across participants to control for
order effects. All other aspects of Experiment 2 were the same as Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend Experiment 1 by examining whether
certain emotional expression with different decoding strategies have unique influences on the
encoding and recognition of person identity. Participants saw actors displaying happy and angry
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expressions (as in Experiment 1) along with sad, disgusted, fearful, and surprised expressions.
Experiment 2 also included a second exposure to the actors seen during the face-perception task.
During this second task, participants judged the emotion displayed by each of the actors. Based
on previous findings that actors previously seen displaying a positive rather than negative
expressions was better recognized when later seen displaying a neutral expression (i.e.,
D’Argembeau et al., 2003a; D’Argembeau et al., 2003b; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004;
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2007), and because classification accuracy rates are highest for
happy facial expressions (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000; Wallbott & Ricci-Bitti, 1993),
participants’ recognition accuracy for person identity was expected to be highest for actors
previously seen displaying a happy expression. Furthermore, if participants rated the neutral
expressions as being more emotionally negative than neutral, and this negative emotion
associated with the neutral expressions seen at inspection is boosting recognition rates for actors
seen with a negative expressions at test, then participants in the neutral expression at encoding
condition should show the highest recognition rates for actors displaying angry, sad and disgust
expressions at test.
As in Experiment 1, participants’ judgment accuracy was assessed using Wagner’s
(1993) method for calculating unbiased hit rates and chance values. Paired t-tests revealed that
participants performed at a level exceeding their own chance values, all ps < .001 (see Table 2).
Difference scores were calculated for each participant by subtracting chance values from
unbiased hit rates.
Recognition accuracy. A 2 (encoding condition: emotion expressions at inspection,
neutral expressions at inspection) × 6 (facial expression: happy, angry, sad, fear, surprised,
disgusted) analysis of variance performed on difference scores (unbiased hit rates − chances
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rates) to explore the influence of encoding condition and emotional expression on participants’
ability to recognize the actors revealed a main effect of emotional expression, which was
qualified by a significant interaction of emotional expression and encoding condition. Whether
participants initially saw actors displaying an emotional or a neutral expression, in combination
with whether the actors were happy, angry, sad, fearful, surprised or disgusted, altered their
ability to recognize the actor, F(5, 156) = 2.9, p < . 05 (see Figure 4). Pairwise comparisons
revealed that participants recognized significantly more actors displaying neutral expressions at
test when they had previously seen the actor displaying a surprised expression (p = .03) or a
happy expression (marginal, p = .11) rather than a disgusted expression. Participants who saw
actors displaying neutral expressions at encoding, however, also recognized significantly more
actors displaying surprised expressions at test than actors displaying either fearful (p = .02),
disgusted (p = .002), happy (p = .001) or sad expressions (p < .001). There seems to be
something special about surprised expressions, that regardless of when participants receive
expression information (at inspection or at test) it aids in the recognition of the actor associated
with that expression. As in Experiment 1, participants also had marginally higher recognition
rates for actors displaying angry expressions at test than actors displaying happy (p = .06) or sad
expressions (p = .08). In other words, actors initially seen displaying happy expressions may be
encoded in a special way that allows them to be better recognized later, when displaying neutral
expressions, than actors encoded while displaying disgusted expressions. When emotional
expression information is withheld from participants until recognition, however, the newly added
expression information displayed by actors with angry expressions at test makes them more
easily recognized than actors displaying happy or sad expressions. Overall, participants in the
emotional expressions at encoding condition had significantly higher recognition rates than
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participants in the neutral expressions at encoding condition for happy expressions (p = .02) and
marginally higher recognition rates for sad expressions (p = .11).
Confidence ratings. A 2 (encoding condition: emotion expressions at inspection, neutral
expressions at inspection) × 6 (facial expression: happy, angry, sad, fear, surprised, disgusted)
analysis of variance performed on mean confidence ratings for recognition accuracy (hits for
person identity) to explore the influence of encoding condition and emotional expression on
participants’ confidence in their ability to recognize the actors revealed a main effect of
emotional expression, which was qualified by a significant interaction of emotional expression
and encoding condition.. Whether participants initially saw actors displaying an emotional or a
neutral expression, in combination with whether the actors were happy, angry, sad, fearful,
surprised or disgusted, altered confidence in their judgments, F(5, 116) = 4.4, p < . 001 (See
Figure 5). Participants’ increased recognition accuracy for actors initially seen displaying
surprised or happy expressions, rather than disgusted expressions, was not accompanied by
increased confidence in these same judgments. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni
adjustments revealed that participants in the emotional expressions at encoding condition were
significantly more confident in their recognition judgments for actors seen with happy
expressions at inspection than for actors seen with sad expressions (p = .04). Participants were
also marginally more confident in their recognition judgments for actors seen with surprised
expressions at inspection than for actors seen with sad expressions (p = .10, marginal
significance). Likewise, participants increased recognition accuracy for actors displaying a
surprised or angry expression rather than a happy or sad expression at test was only partially
accompanied by increased confidence in those judgments. Participants in the neutral expressions
at encoding condition were significantly more confident in their recognition judgments for actors
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seen with angry expressions at test than for actors seen with disgusted (p = .02), happy (p = .01),
or surprised expressions (p = .02) at test.
Decision time. A 2 (encoding condition: emotion expressions at inspection, neutral
expressions at inspection) × 6 (facial expression: happy, angry, sad, fear, surprised, disgusted)
analysis of variance was performed on mean reaction times for recognition accuracy (hits for
person identity) to explore the influence of encoding condition and emotional expression on
participants’ decision time for person identity recognition judgments. The time it took
participants to make their judgment was not effected by encoding condition or emotional
expression (all ps > .05).
Perceived emotion. In order to explore participants’ judgments of perceived emotion
displayed in the actors’ expressions, the frequencies of emotion judgment ratings for each
expression was examined (see Table 3). Participants demonstrated high agreement in their
perception of expressions of happiness; over 90% of emotion ratings for happy expressions
indicated either a moderate or strong positive emotion. Likewise, at least 70% of participants’
emotion ratings for expressions of anger and disgust indicated a moderate or strong negative
emotion. The frequency of emotion ratings for neutral and surprised expressions, however, were
more ambiguous. While approximately 40% of participants’ ratings of surprised expressions
indicated neutral emotion, 21% of participant ratings indicated that surprised expressions were
mildly positive and 21% indicated that surprised expressions were mildly negative. Furthermore,
only 27% of participants’ ratings of neutral expression indicated neutral emotion. Participants
perceived neutral expressions as being more negative than positive or neutral; 46% of ratings
indicated that participants perceived neutral expression as being negative while 28% of ratings
indicated that participants perceived neutral expression as being positive.
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Finally, a one-way analysis of variance was employed to test for differences in
participants’ mean emotion ratings of the actors’ expressions. Perceived emotion of the actors’
expressions differed significantly across emotional expressions, F(6, 4354) = 456.9, p< . 001
(see Figure 6). Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments revealed that participants
rated actors’ disgusted and angry expressions as being strongly negative and not significantly
different from one another (p = .93). Emotional expressions of sadness and fear, however, were
rated as mildly negative. Neutral and surprised expressions were rated more emotionally neutral
rather than positive or negative. Finally, happy expressions were rated as being strongly
positive. Ratings for all emotional expressions were significantly different from one another (all
ps > .05) with the exception of anger and disgust.
Exposure time to emotional expressions. A second purpose of including a second
judgment during the face-perception task was to double the exposure time to faces. While
participants in Experiment 1 only saw each actor in the face-perception task for 5 s, participants
in Experiment 2 saw each actor twice, for a total of 10 s. It was predicted that this longer
exposure time would overall increase recognition accuracy (see Tables 1 and 2). Results from
Experiment 2 seem to suggest that the longer exposure time increased recognition accuracy,
especially for participants who viewed actors initially displaying emotional expressions. In
Experiment 1, participants’ recognition accuracy rates were 5% higher than their chance values
for actors displaying neutral expressions who were previously seen displaying happy expressions
or an angry expression. In Experiment 2, participants’ recognition accuracy rates increased to
10% higher than their chance values for actors displaying neutral expressions who were
previously seen displaying happy expressions. Likewise, participants’ recognition accuracy rates
increased from 5% (Experiment 1) to 9% higher than their chance values for actors displaying
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neutral expressions who were previously seen displaying angry expressions. Recognition
accuracy rates for participants who initially viewed actors displaying neutral expressions
increased from 4% (Experiment 1) to 5% (Experiment 2) above chance for actors later seen with
a happy expression. Likewise, recognition accuracy rates increased from 8% (Experiment 1) to
10% (Experiment 2) above chance for actors later seen with an angry expression.
The results from the present study illustrate the differential effect emotional expressions
have on recognition accuracy for person identity. While it seems as though surprised
expressions boost recognition accuracy regardless of encoding condition, happy expressions
boost recognition rates when seen at encoding whereas angry expressions do the same when seen
at recognition. Contrary to predictions, happy expressions did not demonstrate the highest
recognition rate. However, participants recognized significantly more actors displaying neutral
expressions that were previously seen displaying happy expressions rather than disgusted
expressions, which not only replicates the recognition memory advantage for faces previously
seen with a positive rather than a negative expression (i.e., D’Argembeau et al., 2003a;
D’Argembeau et al., 2003b; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2007) but also replicates studies in our laboratory (VonWaldner & Mendolia, 2010).
Also of significance, the results of Experiment 2 replicate the findings of Experiment 1,
suggesting that there is something special about angry expressions that makes the actors
displaying an angry expressions more easily recognized than actors displaying happy or sad
expressions.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The overall purpose of the present studies was to explore the role of emotion in person
identity recognition—specifically, whether a person’s emotional expression affects the accuracy
with which the person’s identity may be remembered. Furthermore, both studies were designed
to explore whether emotional expression information enhances person identity recognition when
such information is presented at inspection (i.e., the expression may help us to process or learn
the face in a special way), or whether emotional expression information enhances person identity
recognition when such information is presented at test (i.e., the new expression information may
help us to retrieve the memory trace).
In Experiment 1, participants viewed actors displaying either happy or angry expressions
at inspection and were then tested with actors displaying neutral expressions, or participants
viewed actors displaying neutral expressions at inspection and were then tested with actors
displaying happy and angry expressions. Results from Experiment 1, contrary to predictions,
suggest that emotional expressions influence memory for a person’s identity when the expression
information is available at the time of recognition but not when emotional expression
information is available during inspection. In other words, when emotional expressions were
present during the recognition test, participants’ accuracy rates were higher for actors displaying
angry expression as compared to actors displaying happy expressions. When emotional
expression information was available at inspection, however, this added piece of information
encoded for each actor did not seem to influence participants’ memory for those actors.
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In Experiment 2, participants not only viewed happy and angry expressions, but also
fearful, sad, surprised and disgusted expressions, again, either at inspection or at test.
Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether emotional expression with different decoding
strategies influences recognition accuracy for person identity. Results indicated that surprised
expressions improved recognition accuracy regardless of whether emotional expression
information was present at inspection or at test. Although the results from Experiment 1 did not
support the predicted hypothesis that participants would recognize more actors displaying a
neutral expressions who previously displayed a happy expression rather than an angry
expressions, Experiment 2 did partially support this hypothesis. Participants recognized
significantly more actors displaying neutral expressions who previously displayed a happy
expression rather than a disgusted expression. Not only does this finding replicate previous
studies in our laboratory (VonWaldner & Mendolia, 2010), but this also replicates the
recognition memory advantage for faces previously seen with a positive rather than a negative
expression (i.e., D’Argembeau et al., 2003a; D’Argembeau et al., 2003b; D’Argembeau & Van
der Linden, 2004; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2007). Replicating the findings of
Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 recognized significantly more actors displaying
angry rather than happy or sad expressions who they had previously seen displaying a neutral
expression.
Decoding strategies associated with emotional expressions. The present studies suggest
that there is something special about expressions of happiness, anger, and surprise in their
influence of person identity recognition. When considering the decoding strategies associated
with each expression, there is some overlap in strategies used. Anger, rated by participants as
the most negative emotion, and happiness, rated as the most positive emotion, are decoded in a
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similar fashion (Wallbott & Ricci-Bitti, 1993) and primarily associated by distinct movement in
the mouth area (Katsikitis, 1997). Surprise, on the other hand, rated as being most emotionally
neutral, is predominantly associated with distinct movement in the eyebrow area, although
expressions of anger are classified by eyebrow movement as well. The raised eyebrows
associated with surprised expressions as well as the smile associated with happy expression serve
as distinct emotion-consistent features that aid in the decoding and classification of these
expressions of emotion (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000).
Anger expressions influence person identity recognition. Taken together, the results from
the present studies suggest that there is something unique about the emotion of anger such that
when we see someone angry we are more likely to remember that person even though we haven’t
seen him or her express this particular emotion before. From an evolutionary perspective, based
on the idea that emotions have an adaptive function for our survival, anger serves a means to
destroy a barrier to the satisfaction of a need (Plutchik, 1984). In other words, when we see a
person displaying an angry expression, we can infer that an obstacle or an enemy is blocking him
or her from obtaining some desired goal or need. Since the predominant behavior associated
with the emotion of anger involves the destruction of this barrier to goal attainment, it would
benefit the observer to pay special attention to the person displaying an angry expression,
especially if the expression of that emotion is directed at that observer. Because facial
expressions of anger provide a warning that aversive consequences are likely, a bias in orienting
attention to salient facial gestures that convey anger has been observed (i.e., Hansen & Hansen,
1988; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Research has also demonstrated that emotional stimuli such as
facial expressions of emotion alter the emotional affect of the observer (i.e., Lang, Bradley &
Cuthbert, 1992; Bradley & Lang, 2007). In the present investigation then it seems likely that
	
  

42	
  

	
  

	
  

participants would feel threatened by and thus pay more attention to actors who displayed angry
expressions, which would then increase recognition accuracy ratings for these same actors as
well.
Based on the threatening nature of the angry faces used in both Experiments 1 and 2, and
the bias in attention paid to angry faces, it seems plausible that participants in Experiments 1 and
2 recognized more actors who were later seen displaying angry expressions due to the extra
attention paid to those actors during the recognition test. Although participants in the emotional
expressions at encoding condition also saw the threatening angry faces during inspection, this
threat becomes irrelevant because actors who previously displayed an angry expression are now
viewed in an emotionally neutral way. In other words, the social situation surrounding those
particular actors has changed from being threatening to non-threatening, and thus not requiring
any addition attention.
Surprise expressions influence person identity recognition. The results from Experiment
2 suggest that there is something special about surprised expressions that regardless of when
participants receive expression information (at inspection or at test) surprised expressions aid in
the recognition of the actor associated with that expression. From an evolutionary perspective,
the emotion of surprise serves the general function of an interrupter mechanism (Tomkins,
1984). Surprise interrupts our current behavior or state of mind and reorients our attention to a
new, possibly significant event (Plutchik, 1984). In other words, surprise can be considered an
emotionally neutral precursor to all other emotions. After being interrupted by a novel situation,
we will respond with happiness, fear, anger, disgust, or sadness depending on our appraisal of
the interrupting stimulus (Tomkins, 1984).
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The emotion of surprise is different from other basic emotions not only in emotional
valence but also in the associated antecedent behavior as well. Anger, fear, sadness and disgust
all have a negative valence while the emotion of happiness has a positive valence. Surprise, on
the other hand, has neither a positive or negative valence. It is, instead, affectively neutral
(Tomkins, 1984). Also different from the other basic emotions, the antecedent for the emotion of
surprise is unknown (Plutchik, 1984). In other words, a person can experience surprise in
response to a wide variety of situations. Other basic emotions included in Experiment 2 have
stable antecedent events that reliably elicit each specific emotion. For example, as discussed
above, we can infer that a person displaying an angry expression has had some sort of obstacle
block him or her from obtaining a desired goal or need (Plutchik, 1984). Likewise, we also
know that a person displaying a sad expression has experienced a significant loss of someone or
something of value. Surprise, on the other hand, is an emotional response to some unexpected
stimulus or situation. The situation can be positive, negative or even neutral. In the present
investigation then, it seems likely that because of these obvious differences between emotional
expressions of surprise and the other basic emotions included, participants may have directed
more attention to actors displaying surprised expressions.
Because of these differences between surprise and the other basic emotions included in
Experiment 2, it is not surprising that participants in both encoding conditions treated the actors
displaying surprised expressions differently than actors displaying any of the other emotions.
Participants who viewed actors displaying emotional expressions during the face-perception task
may have paid more attention to the actors displaying surprised expressions, and therefore
encoded these faces in a special way that allowed them to recognize these actors more readily
than actors who were previously displaying other emotions. For example, because the emotion
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of surprise is affectively neutral and the antecedent is unknown, participants may have to pay
more attention to or think harder about actors displaying expressions of surprise when making
personality trait judgments or emotion ratings. Likewise, if participants were paying more
attention to or thinking harder about actors displaying surprised expressions, then it would
necessarily follow that participants who viewed actors displaying neutral expression at
inspection would recognize more actors who were displaying surprised expressions at test.
Evidence against independent processing of identity and expression information.
Although classical models of face recognition have posited separate functional routes for the
processing of facial identity and the processing of facial expression (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986),
results from the present studies suggest that information about a person’s identity and the
emotional expression he or she displays are not processed completely independently of one
another. For example, because person identity recognition was significantly higher for actors
displaying one emotion rather than another, it necessarily follows that the successful processing
of information about a person’s identity depends, to an extent, on the emotion that person is
displaying. Also, because certain emotions influenced person recognition when seen during
encoding while others influenced person recognition when seen during recognition, the present
findings thus suggest that the processing of facial identity and facial expression interact at
different stages of the information processing sequence.
Limitations and future directions. In order to have a more complete picture of the nature
of the relationship between emotional expressions and memory for a person’s identity,
limitations from the present studies should be addressed. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2
suggest that emotional expressions differentially influence our memory for a person’s identity.
In order to better understand the influence of emotional expression on person identity
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recognition, the present research design can be extended to include conditions in which
participants see different emotional expressions during inspection and test. Specifically, from
the present studies we know that participants who see actors displaying happy expressions, for
example, will be more likely to recognize those actors when later seen displaying a neutral
expression. Likewise, we can be confident that participants who see actors displaying neutral
expressions will be more likely to recognize those actors when later seen displaying an angry
expression. Therefore, what we want to understand is the influence of emotion on person
identity recognition when one emotional expression is seen at inspection and another emotional
expression is seen at test. If the decoding strategies associated with specific emotional
expressions have unique influences on person identity recognition when expression information
is available both at inspection and at test, then it is necessary to further explore the nature of the
relationship between emotion and person identity recognition by using a design that incorporates
emotional expressions at both inspection and test. Future directions for this current program of
research should include a study in which participants are exposed to actors displaying various
emotional expressions at inspection and are tested with the same actors displaying different
emotions.
Once a complete picture of the influence emotional expression information has on our
memory for others is realized, then analog models for witness identification procedures could
potentially be developed. If we learn, for example, that participant who are exposed to angry
faces recognize those same individuals best when seen at a later date displaying a happy
expression, then perhaps witness identification procedures that include standard mug shots
should include instead, a series of photos of the suspect displaying a variety of expressions. In
other words, the basic research described here may potentially have the necessary implications to
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move emotion, as in relates to expressions displayed by perpetrators, from an estimator variable
to a system variable under the control of the criminal justice system. Since the current studies
suggest that having this added piece of information at the time of recognition boosts recognition
rates for certain emotions, it seems likely to follow that eye witnesses who are provided with this
extra bit of facial information for the suspects in question would also recognize the individual
who committed the crime with greater accuracy
In sum, the current studies presented here highlight the complex relationship between
emotional expressions and memory for a person’s identity. Results indicate that emotional
expression information differentially influences our memory for others, with some expressions
exerting their greatest influence when such information is available at inspection, while others
are more influential when expression information is available during test. The results of the
present studies are significant in both their contributions made to the understanding of this
complex relationship as well as the manner in which they highlight the next step necessary for
learning the final piece to this complex puzzle of emotional expressions and memory for others.
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Table 1
Unbiased Hit Rates and Chance Values for Person Identity Recognition as a Function of
Encoding Condition and Facial Expression (Experiment 1)
Expression at Encoding (Recognition)
Emotional (Neutral)

Neutral (Emotional)

Happy

.33 (.28)

.33 (.29)

Angry

.32 (.27)

.41 (.33)

Emotional Expression

N
119
108
Note. Values in parentheses indicate chance levels calculated using Wagner’s (1993) method.
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Table 2
Unbiased Hit Rates and Chance Values for Person Identity Recognition as a Function of
Encoding Condition and Facial Expression (Experiment 2)
Expression at Encoding (Recognition)
Emotional (Neutral)

Neutral (Emotional)

Afraid

.38 (.30)

.49 (.41)

Angry

.40 (.31)

.47 (.37)

Disgusted

.31 (.27)

.44 (.35)

Happy

.42 (.32)

.38 (.33)

Sad

.37 (.30)

.46 (.42)

Surprised

.46 (.34)

.55 (.39)

Emotional Expression

N
93
81
Note. Values in parentheses indicate chance levels calculated using Wagner’s (1993) method.

	
  

57	
  

	
  

	
  

Table 3
Frequency Distribution of Emotion Ratings as a Function of Emotional Expression
Emotion Rating (%)
Emotional Expression

Negative
0
1

Afraid

12.1

24.1

33.2

Angry

40.9

28.5

Disgusted

47.1

Happy

	
  

4

5

Positive
6

22.6

6.5

.3

1.2

16.3

9.5

3.0

.6

1.2

27.8

16.7

6.4

1.2

.3

.6

.3

0

0

.9

7.1

30.5

61.3

Sad

24.6

29.7

30.5

12.9

1.4

.3

.6

Surprised

5.4

4.5

21.1

40.2

21.1

4.8

2.7

Neutral

12.8

12.9

19.9

26.6

15.4

8.3

4.1
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Figure 1. Recognition accuracy for person identity as a function of encoding condition and
emotional expression. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting chance values from
unbiased hit rates.
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Figure 2. Mean reaction time for recognition accuracy (hits for person identity) as a function of
encoding condition and emotional expression.
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Figure 3. Mean confidence rating for recognition accuracy (hits for person identity) as a
function of encoding condition and emotional expression. Higher scores indicate greater
confidence.
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Figure 4. Recognition accuracy for person identity as a function of encoding condition and
emotional expression. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting chance values from
unbiased hit rates.

	
  

62	
  

	
  

	
  

Figure 5. Mean confidence rating for recognition accuracy (hits for person identity) as a
function of encoding condition and emotional expression. Higher scores indicate greater
confidence.
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Figure 6. Mean perceived emotion as a function of emotional expression displayed by actors.
Emotional expressions were rated on a 7-point scale with anchors of 0 (negative) and 6
(positive).
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